Events/SCRAMS

8/27

TURBINE GENERATOR NEUTRAL OVERVOLTAGE CAUSES A REACTOR SCRAM

Hot Shutdown ~ Power Reactor Event Number: 50404
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1]

Current Event Notification Report for August 27, 2014

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/26/2014 – 08/27/2014

** EVENT NUMBERS **

50377 50379 50400 50404

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Non-Agreement State Event Number: 50377
Rep Org: PATRIOT ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: PATRIOT ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENT
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 092-1073-1
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN KING
HQ OPS Officer: DANIEL MILLS
Notification Date: 08/18/2014
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2014
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) – SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

DAMAGED MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE

A moisture/density gauge was run over by a bulldozer at a construction site in Indianapolis, Indiana. The RSO performed surveys of the gauge and no abnormal dose rates were observed. The gauge was leak tested and the data has been sent to Seaman Nuclear Products for analysis. The gauge has been removed from service and is secured at the licensee’s facility.

The gauge is a Seaman Model C-75 moisture/density gauge and typically contains 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be.

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Agreement State Event Number: 50379
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAYLOR ALL SAINTS MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: L-02212
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/19/2014
Notification Time: 10:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2014
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DRAKE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT – IODINE-125 SEEDS POSITIONED INCORRECTLY DURING IMPLANTATION

The following information was received via E-mail:

“On August 18, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] that on August 15, 2014, it discovered that a medical event had occurred. One of the licensee’s patients had iodine-125 seed implantation in July 2014 and on August 7, 2014, a post-plan computed tomography scan was performed. During the post-plan evaluation, the licensee discovered that the seeds had not been positioned in the target tissue as prescribed during implantation. The licensee believes that approximately 30 percent of the prescribed dose was delivered to the target tissue. The licensee is evaluating the data to determine actual dosimetrics and will report its calculated dose to the intended and other tissue to the Agency upon completion. The Agency will provide further information in accordance with SA-300.”

This event occurred at the Baylor All Saints Medical Center in Fort Worth, Texas.

Texas Incident #: I-9221

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility’s use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1706 EDT ON 8/25/14 * * *

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

“The licensee for this event was initially reported as Texas Oncology, license L-05545. It has been determined that Baylor All Saints Medical Center Radiology Department, license L-02212, is the actual licensee the implantation procedure in this event was licensed under. The licensees are continuing their investigation and will submit a written report within the required 15 days.”

Notified R4DO (Pick) and FSME Events Resource via email.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50400
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GERALD BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/26/2014
Notification Time: 11:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/26/2014
Event Time: 07:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) – LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY MCKINLEY (R1DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNIT 2 HIGH RANGE STACK RADIATION MONITOR TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

Millstone removed their unit 2 high range site radiation monitor, RM-8168, from service for pre-planned maintenance. RM-8168 was restored to service at 1012 EDT on 8/26/14.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the town of Waterford.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 50404
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NEEL SHUKLA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/26/2014
Notification Time: 21:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/26/2014
Event Time: 17:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) – RPS ACTUATION – CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) – VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVE ROSE (R2DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 95 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

TURBINE GENERATOR NEUTRAL OVERVOLTAGE CAUSES A REACTOR SCRAM

“At 1730 CDT on August 26, 2014, Browns Ferry Unit 1 experienced a turbine trip resulting in an automatic reactor scram. The cause of the turbine trip was a control valve fast closure signal that was generated by a turbine trip on generator neutral over voltage signal. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) remained open with the main turbine bypass valves controlling reactor pressure. The Reactor Feedwater Pumps are in service to control reactor water level.

“Primary Containment Isolation Systems (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals, all required components actuated as required with the exception of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) train A, which is under a clearance for planned maintenance. Neither High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) nor Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiation signals were received. Initially, three Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs) opened to control the pressure surge and subsequently reclosed.

“This event requires a 4 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), ‘Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.’

“This event also requires an 8 hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), ‘Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including reactor scram or reactor trip, and (2) General containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).’

“The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

“Service Request 926468 was initiated in the Corrective Action Program.”

The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. The licensee is investigating the cause of the generator neutral overvoltage signal. There was no impact on units 2 and 3.

Power Reactor Event Number: 50400

Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2]

UNIT 2 HIGH RANGE STACK RADIATION MONITOR TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

Millstone removed their unit 2 high range site radiation monitor, RM-8168, from service for pre-planned maintenance. RM-8168 was restored to service at 1012 EDT on 8/26/14.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the town of Waterford.

And other reportable events…
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/en.html

7/4/14

TURBINE BUILDING PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING NON-FUNCTIONAL

Power Reactor Event Number: 50259
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS RULLMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/04/2014
Notification Time: 08:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/04/2014
Event Time: 02:33 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/04/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) – LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)

 

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TURBINE BUILDING PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING NON-FUNCTIONAL”At 0233 PDT on July 4, 2014, TEA-RIS-13 and the Turbine Building process radiation monitoring sample rack were declared non-functional. The cause of the malfunction is under investigation. Compensatory measures have been implemented to obtain radiation readings from the associated effluent release pathway. Field team assessment function was unaffected and remains available.

“This event is being reported as a major loss of assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

“The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.”

3/14/14

re; LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY – NON-FUNCTIONAL AREA RADIATION MONITORS on January 8 ,2014

HIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED
Power Reactor Event Number: 49702
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL LONG
HQ OPS Officer: GEROND GEORGE
Notification Date: 01/08/2014
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/08/2014
Event Time: 10:10 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) – LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)

 

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY – NON-FUNCTIONAL AREA RADIATION MONITORS”At [1010 PST] on 1/08/14, during performance of a surveillance the power supply for ten area radiation monitors in the Reactor Building was found with voltage out of specification. As a result, the affected area radiation monitors were declared non-functional. This condition represents a major loss of assessment capability and is being reported as such under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted until the power supply is restored.”The Resident Inspector has been notified.”* * * UPDATE FROM JASON LOVEGREN TO JIM DRAKE ON 01/10/2014 AT 0214 EST* * *

“The power supply voltage has been restored to specification per applicable station procedures. All affected area radiation monitors have been declared functional. Compensatory measures have been suspended.”

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 3/13/14 AT 1853 EDT FROM JOHN KAINEG TO DONG PARK * * *

“Licensee is retracting this event notification based on the following:

“Energy Northwest performed an evaluation for the reported out-of-specification voltage condition for the power supply to several radiation monitors in the Reactor Building. The evaluation concluded that the voltage deviation from the -24 VDC set point was small and within the calculated uncertainty for the instrument, and did not result in equipment failure. Therefore, it was concluded that the radiation monitors were functional and that the reported major loss of assessment capability did not occur.”

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

 

3/14/14 Columbia Generating Station, Hanford/WA

Malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSPV), which has been observed to impair control rod scram performance. 
The effect of the malfunction is to degrade scram performance of an affected control rod. The safety significance of this condition cannot be determined at this time (affects Columbia Generating Station Reactor)
Event Number: 49908
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: ASCO VALVE, INC.
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LISA SCHICHLEIN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/13/2014
Notification Time: 13:05 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) – INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
MARC FERDAS (R1DO)
KATHLEEN O’DONOHUE (R2DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 – UNSEATING OF VALVE SPRING ON SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE”This concerns an evaluation being performed by GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) regarding a malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve (SSPV), which has been observed to impair control rod scram performance. As stated herein, GEH has not concluded that this is a reportable condition in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR 21.21(d). The SSPV manufacturer (ASCO Valve, Inc.) has not yet concluded its own investigation under 10CFR 21, and the results of that investigation are needed as input for the GEH evaluation. The manufacturer has issued an Interim Report, which provides confidence that this condition is limited to a very small portion of the suspect population.”A malfunction of a Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve was attributed to the disengagement of the valve spring from the valve plunger. The effect of the malfunction is to degrade scram performance of an affected control rod. The safety significance of this condition cannot be determined at this time, but several mitigating and compensatory functions have been identified.”This evaluation affects Fermi 2, Columbia, Dresden 2-3, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, and Browns Ferry 1-3.

 

 

3/12/14 Columbia Generating Station, Hanford/WA

SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE NOT EXHAUSTING PROPERLY
The valve had been installed in Energy Northwest’s Columbia facility for approximately 7 months and had been cycled 60-70 times. Energy Northwest’s internal investigation revealed the pilot head assembly spring was not in the groove of the associated core.
Part 21 Event Number: 49895
Rep Org: ASCO VALVE INCORPORATED
Licensee: ASCO VALVE INCORPORATED
Region: 1
City: AIKEN State: SC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB ARNONE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/11/2014
Notification Time: 13:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2014
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) – INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)

Event Text

PART 21 – SCRAM SOLENOID PILOT VALVE NOT EXHAUSTING PROPERLYThe following was excerpted from a fax received from ASCO Valve, Inc.:”Problem Description”GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) customer Energy Northwest reported that an ASCO scram solenoid pilot valve (SSPV) Catalog number HVL266000010J 115/60, GE-H part number 107E6022P014, serial number A272718-054, CRD-SPV-118/1043 did not exhaust properly. The valve had been installed in Energy Northwest’s Columbia facility for approximately 7 months and had been cycled 60-70 times. Energy Northwest’s internal investigation revealed the pilot head assembly spring was not in the groove of the associated core.”Conclusion

“Various tests were performed to rule out possible manufacturing non-conformances in the spring or core. The successful completion of these tests has established that when the spring is properly installed on the core, the spring will not come off in service. We have not yet identified any other conditions that could cause the spring to come off the core, except for improper assembly.

“This configuration of spring and core design was used on the original 090405 scram valve. There has not been any design change to this core assembly since its inception in 1959. This spring/core assembly makes up the bulk of ASCO core solenoid offering. It is used across all of ASCO valve ranges in the Commercial, Nuclear, Military, and Petrochemical markets. ASCO has supplied over 10 million valves to these markets over the entire product offering. This Includes over 50,000 Nuclear Qualified Valves. With the exception of the 1994 and 2012 events, a review of ASCO return records found no other cases of this condition where a spring disengaged from the core.

“Since ASCO does not have adequate knowledge of the actual installations and operating conditions of these valves, it was not able to be determined if this could create a ‘Substantial safety hazard’ as defined in 10 CFR Part 21. This information is intended to provide interim investigation results.

“If you have any questions, you can contact Bob Arnone at 803-641-9395.”

 

 


 

3/12/14  Columbia Generating Station Hanford/WA

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT

Power Reactor Event Number: 49898
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM HART
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/11/2014
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/11/2014
Event Time: 10:01 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/11/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) – UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POSTULATED HOT SHORT FIRE EVENT THAT COULD ADVERSELY IMPACT SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT”An extent of condition review of all unfused ammeters circuits in Direct Current (DC) distribution systems at Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) identified areas in the plant which may be susceptible to secondary fires due to hot shorts from these unfused ammeters. It is postulated that a fire in one fire area can damage these circuits and cause short circuits without protection that would overheat the cables and possibly result in secondary fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to conduct a safe shutdown as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.”This condition is reportable as an 8-hour ENS report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.”Compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas of the plant.”The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.”

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